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OPINION OF THE COURT
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
The United States Secretary of Labor appeals an order
from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania dismissing the Secretary’s complaint under the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”),
29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The District Court determined that John Johnson’s
administrative complaint, underlying the Secretary’s LMRDA
enforcement action, had not been timely filed and that,
therefore, the Secretary’s effort to seek relief for Johnson
against Local 234 of the Transit Workers Union (“TWU”)1
could not proceed.  For the following reasons, we will reverse
the judgment and remand for further proceedings. 
    While it is not entirely clear from the record, it appears2
that Johnson nominated Ostrowski for both positions on a
single candidate slate.  (App. at B60.)
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I. Background
Throughout April 2007, Local 234 accepted candidate
slates for its upcoming election of officers.  Johnson, a candidate
for president of the Local, submitted a slate nominating Mickey
Ostrowski for two different positions, Recording Secretary and
Secretary Treasurer.   On May 7, 2007, Local 234’s election2
committee sent Ostrowski a letter informing him that he had
been nominated for two positions and that he had to choose
which to pursue, because multiple candidacies are forbidden by
the Union.  When Ostrowski nevertheless submitted acceptance
letters for both positions, the committee informed him that he
had violated TWU’s nomination procedures and was thus
ineligible to run for office.  The committee then informed
Johnson that, as a result of Ostrowski’s disqualification, he no
longer had a full slate of candidates and his entire slate was
disqualified under TWU’s election rule prohibiting partial
candidate slates. 
Article XV, Section 7, of the TWU constitution
establishes procedures for members pursuing election protests.
It reads, in relevant part, as follows:
Any member in good standing who believes that
he/she has been improperly denied the
opportunity to be a candidate for an elective
    Article XXII, Section 1, of the TWU constitution provides,3
“[t]he Committee on Appeals shall have the power to decide
all appeals from Local Unions and their members in any
matter relating to the application of this Constitution or the
By-Laws of the Local Union.”  (App. at B10.)
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office or position, or who believes that an election
in which he/she was a candidate was improperly
conducted, may file a complaint with his/her
Local Executive Board.  If he/she is dissatisfied
with the action of the Local Executive Board on
his/her complaint, he/she may, within 15 days
thereafter, or within 30 days after filing his/her
complaint with the Local Executive Board if the
Board has not taken final action thereon within
that time, file an appeal to the International Union
... . 
(App. at B9.)
Evidently relying on that provision, Johnson and
Ostrowski filed a complaint on May 30, 2007 with the Local
Executive Board (the “pre-election protest”), challenging both
the disqualification of Ostrowski as a candidate and the resulting
disqualification of the entire Johnson slate.  On June 29, 2008,
the Executive Board rejected the pre-election protest but advised
Johnson and Ostrowski that they could appeal the decision to the
International Union under Article XXII of the TWU
constitution.   Johnson, for himself and on behalf of his slate of3
candidates, then filed a timely appeal with TWU’s International
    On October 9, 2007, Johnson appealed the ICA’s4
unanimous decision to the International Executive Council
(“IEC”), pursuant to Article XXII, Section 1of the TWU
constitution.  The IEC only considers appeals of unanimous
ICA decisions at TWU International Conventions. 
(Appellant’s Op. Br. at 9 n1.)  The next TWU International
Convention is not until 2010, and, accordingly, the IEC has
not acted on Johnson’s appeal.  (Id.)  Johnson’s final appeal to
the IEC is irrelevant to the present analysis, however,
because, as the District Court noted, “it is clear that TWU has
taken no action on the appeal [to the International
Convention] ... [and thus,] under the LMRDA, the Johnson
Slate had four months from the date it invoked its internal
remedies [May 30, 2007] to file a complaint with the
Secretary.”  (App. at A14.)
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Secretary Treasurer, who forwarded the appeal to the
International Committee on Appeals (“ICA”).  The ICA denied
Johnson’s appeal on September 19, 2007.4
Local 234 held its election on September 28, 2007,
without Johnson as a candidate.  Afterward, on October 9,
Johnson filed another protest with the Executive Board (the
“post-election protest”).  When the Executive Board failed to act
on that protest, Johnson filed another appeal with the
International Union on November 7, 2007.  The ICA also failed
to act on his appeal, and, on January 15, 2008, Johnson filed an
administrative complaint with the Secretary of Labor, under
Title IV, § 402, of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 482, alleging that
    The LMRDA provides that, in union elections, “a5
reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination of
candidates, and every member in good standing shall be 
7
Local 234 had violated the LMRDA by disqualifying his slate
of candidates.  5
eligible to be a candidate and to hold office ... .” 29 U.S.C.
§481(e).  
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Title IV of the LMRDA allows aggrieved union members
to file administrative complaints directly with the Secretary of
Labor, provided that the member has satisfied the exhaustion
requirement contained in § 402 of the statute, which states:
(a) A member of a labor organization–
(1) who has exhausted the remedies
available under the constitution and
bylaws of such organization and of any
parent body, or
(2) who has invoked such available
remedies without obtaining a final decision
within three calender months after their
invocation, 
may file a complaint with the Secretary within one
calendar month thereafter alleging the violation of any
provision of section 481 [of the LMRDA] ....
29 U.S.C. § 482(a). 
If the member remains aggrieved after exhausting the
remedies available through the union, the Secretary is required
to investigate the member’s complaint.  Id. § 482(b).  Upon a
finding of “probable cause to believe that a violation [of the
9LMRDA] has occurred and has not been remedied,” the
Secretary must bring a civil enforcement action on behalf of the
member against the union.  Id.  Following statutory protocol, the
Secretary investigated Johnson’s complaint, found probable
cause to believe that there had been a violation of the LMRDA,
and commenced the present enforcement action on behalf of
Johnson against Local 234 in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
Local 234 responded by filing a motion to dismiss,
arguing lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the timing of
Johnson’s administrative complaint to the Secretary.  On
November 12, 2008, the District Court granted the motion to
dismiss.  The Court determined that Johnson’s filing of his
administrative complaint with the Secretary was untimely under
the LMRDA and hence could not be a predicate for the
Secretary’s enforcement action against the Union.  According to
the Court, because the “TWU constitution does not expressly
give its members the opportunity to file both pre-election
protests and post-election protests,” Johnson had just one
opportunity to file a protest, which he took when he filed his
pre-election protest.  (App. at A13.)  Having thus concluded that
Johnson’s post-election protest was invalid, the District Court
held that Johnson’s pre-election protest must serve as the
pertinent point of reference for determining whether Johnson’s
administrative complaint to the Secretary was timely under the
LMRDA.  (Id. at A12-A13.)  The Court alternatively held that,
even if Johnson’s post-election protest had been valid under the
TWU constitution, our precedent requires that the timeliness of
an LMRDA administrative complaint be measured from a union
member’s pre-election protest and not a later post-election
    It is uncontested that Johnson’s administrative complaint6
would have been timely under the LMRDA had it been
measured from his post-election protest and not his pre-
election protest. 
10
protest.  (Id. at A11.)  When measured from the date of
Johnson’s pre-election protest, Johnson’s administrative
complaint was, the Court said, invalid because it was untimely
under § 482(a) and therefore could not serve as the foundation
for the Secretary’s enforcement action against TWU.  The
District Court accordingly dismissed the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.   (Id.)  The Secretary’s timely appeal6
followed.
II. Discussion
The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 482 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  Our
jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary
review over a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.  Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169,
176 (3d Cir. 2000); Reich v. Local 30, Int’l Bd. of Teamsters, 6
F.3d 978, 981-82 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Teamsters, Local 30”).
The Secretary argues that the District Court’s dismissal
of her enforcement action was error because Johnson’s post-
election protest is allowed by the text of the TWU constitution
and, hence, constitutes an available internal union remedy that
can serve as the relevant event for determining the timeliness of
Johnson’s administrative complaint under the LMRDA.
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Specifically, the Secretary argues that “[t]he TWU constitution
nowhere prohibited Johnson from filing his post-election
protest,” and that “long-standing precedent dictates that union
complaint procedures must be liberally construed in favor of a
complaining union member.”  (Appellant’s Op. Br. at 17.)  She
further contends that, as long as the post-election protest is valid
under the TWU constitution, nothing in the LMRDA or in our
case law prohibits a union member from filing a complaint with
the Secretary based on a post-election protest simply because a
pre-election protest had also been filed.  (Id. at 24.)  The Union,
of course, responds that the District Court’s interpretation of the
TWU constitution is correct and that Johnson’s post-election
protest was invalid and cannot support the Secretary’s
enforcement action.  (Appellee’s Ans. Br. at 13-16.)
Congress enacted the LMRDA to remedy abuses in union
elections without departing from the “longstanding
congressional policy against unnecessary governmental
interference with internal union affairs.”  Hodgson v. Local
6799, United Steelworkers of Am., 403 U.S. 333, 338 (1971)
(citation omitted) (“Steelworkers, Local 6799”).  Congress thus
included in the Act a requirement that “union members
protesting the conduct of elections exhaust their internal union
remedies before complaining to the Secretary ... .”  Id. at 336;
see also 29 U.S.C. § 482(a).  In an early case involving the
LMRDA, the Supreme Court held that “any interpretation of the
exhaustion requirement must reflect the needs of rank and file
union members—those people the requirement is designed
ultimately to serve.”  Steelworkpers, Local 6799, 403 U.S. at
340.  The Court admonished that “members should not be held
to procedural niceties while seeking redress within their
12
unions ... .”  Id. at 341 n.6.  We have likewise emphasized that
internal union protest procedures are “designed ultimately to
serve rank and file union members,” and that “any ambiguities
must be liberally construed in favor of the complaining
member.”  Donovan v. Local 126, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
728 F.2d 610, 613 (3d Cir. 1984) (citations omitted) (“Elec.
Workers, Local 126”).  Our sister circuits have similarly held
that when a rank and file union member is faced with internal
union protest procedures that may be unclear or ambiguous, the
member need only do what is “reasonable under the
circumstances.”  See, e.g., Dole v. United Auto. Aerospace and
Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 970 F.2d 1562, 1568 (6th Cir.
1992) (finding that union members’ efforts at obtaining internal
resolution of their complaints were “reasonable under the
circumstances” and thus sufficient to meet § 402’s exhaustion
requirements); Stevens v. Nw. Ind. Dist. Council, United Broth.
of Carpenters, 20 F.3d 720, 733 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that,
while “failure to properly exhaust should lead a federal court to
stay its hand until exhaustion can be completed,” the exhaustion
requirement must nevertheless be a “reasonable” one); Donovan
v. Sailors’ Union of the Pac., 739 F.2d 1426, 1428 (9th Cir.
1984) (holding that a union member’s protest was “reasonable
under the circumstances,” and thus timely under the LMRDA,
where the union was unclear about its own protest procedures).
In evaluating whether, under the LMRDA, a union
member has properly exhausted remedies available within the
union, courts look to the union’s constitution.  See Hodgson v.
Dist. 19, United Steelworkers of Am., 459 F.2d 348, 350 (3d Cir.
1972)  (“Steelworkers, District 19”) (“In order to decide whether
the Secretary’s position is correct, we must examine the
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International Constitution to determine if avenues were open
within the union ... .”).  Thus, we must review the relevant
provision from the TWU constitution.  Article XV, Section 7 of
that charter governs election protests.  As earlier noted, it
provides, in part, that
[a]ny member in good standing who believes that
he/she has been improperly denied the
opportunity to be a candidate for an elective
office or position, or who believes that an election
in which he/she was a candidate was improperly
conducted, may file a complaint with his/her
Local Executive Board.
(App. at B9.)
Working from this provision, the District Court held that
“the TWU constitution, in Article XV, Section 7, gives its union
members [only] one opportunity to file a complaint.  That
complaint may be either pre-election or post-election.”  (App. at
A13.)  The Court concluded that the Secretary had failed to
demonstrate that Johnson filed a valid post-election protest,
because Johnson had already filed a pre-election one.  It
appears, then, that the District Court interpreted the clause
stating that “a member may file a complaint” as meaning that a
member may file one and only one election protest.   While the
Secretary concedes that this is one “plausible interpretation of
the text of the relevant constitutional provision” (Appellant’s
Op. Br. at 20), she argues that it is not the only plausible
interpretation, and we agree.  The same language can reasonably
be understood to mean that a member is entitled to file at least
     Borrowing from longstanding rules of statutory7
construction, we note that “in the event the words and
provisions are ‘ambiguous—that is, whether they are
reasonably susceptible of different interpretations,’ we look
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one protest, not only one protest.  In other words, the provision
is ambiguous.
In interpreting the TWU constitution as it did, the District
Court did not heed the mandate that ambiguous constitutional
provisions must be “liberally construed in favor of the
complaining member.”  Elec. Workers, Local 126, 728 F.2d at
613.  When confronted by the ambiguity in Article XV, Section
7, Johnson was only required to interpret the language in a way
that was reasonable under the circumstances.  See Donovan, 739
F.2d at 1428 (holding that a union member’s method of election
protest was “reasonable under the circumstances” and thus
constituted a “reasonable[] attempt[]” to invoke his union
remedies); cf. Steelworkers, Local 6799, 403 U.S. at 341
(“[C]ourts should impose a heavy burden on the union to show
that it could not in any way discern that a member was
complaining of the violation in question.”).  His actions
demonstrate that he interpreted the provision as permitting an
aggrieved union member to file both a pre-election and a post-
election protest, which is a legitimate interpretation for at least
three reasons.  First,  as already mentioned, the words “a
complaint” need not mean “just one election protest.”  Second,
the provision itself does not specify whether protests must be
filed pre- or post-election.  And third, moving from this
particular provision to the constitution as a whole,  nowhere7
next at the surrounding words and provisions and also to the
words in context.”  Dobrek v. Phelan, 419 F.3d 259, 264 (3d
Cir. 2005) (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison
Topeka & Santa Few Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 473 n.27
(1985)).
    Nor does the LMRDA proscribe a union member’s filing8
an administrative complaint with the Secretary based on a
post-election protest just because the member has filed a pre-
election protest.  Rather, the statute states without
qualification that a union member “may file a complaint with
the Secretary” after he has invoked his internal remedies.  29
U.S.C. § 482(a). 
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does the TWU constitution bar a union member from filing a
post-election protest because he has already filed a pre-election
protest.   Thus, the language of the TWU constitution itself,8
ambiguous though Article XV, Section 7 is, supports Johnson’s
interpretation as reasonable, particularly in light of the rule that
union constitutions are to be liberally construed in favor of rank
and file members like Johnson.
Local 234 argues, however, that to interpret the TWU
constitution as Johnson did and as the Secretary suggests “would
permit the serial filing of identical post-election complaints by
different members of a disgruntled election slate over an
extended period of time with each successive complaint
restarting the [LMRDA] clock,” which would be “absurd.”
(Appellee’s Ans. Br. at 15.)  The District Court was persuaded
by that argument.  It said, “[t]he Secretary seems to advance a
16
reading [of the TWU constitution] under which union members
may file a protest, pursue appeals, and then refile the same
protest ... .”  (App. at A12.)  
In adopting the Union’s argument, the District Court
failed to recognize that there are legitimate reasons why a labor
organization may want to provide its members with more than
one opportunity to raise the same or similar protests.  For
example, a union may wish to prioritize the goal of member
satisfaction over the goal of internal efficiency, and so afford
members more than one opportunity to be heard.  A union may
also decide that a member could legitimately buttress a pre-
election protest with additional information available only after
the contested election.  In addition, a union may want to give
itself a second opportunity to consider a protest, particularly
when the protest has been developed and refined by further
evidence.  
Local 234 invokes principles of res judicata to explain
why its one-and-only-one protest rule is required.  Just as courts
should not have to hear a complaint twice, Local 234 argues that
unions should not be burdened with repetitive election protests.
(Appellee’s Ans. Br. at 15 n.14 (noting that “res judicata
precludes the re-litigation of claims ... already raised and
adjudicated ... .”).)  That is not a sound analogy, however, as
internal union dispute mechanisms do not implicate the public
policy considerations behind the doctrine of res judicata.  Courts
operate on public funds for the benefit of the general public.
Unions operate on the dues of their members and for the benefit
of their members.  Imposing a judicial model onto union dispute
resolution would be at odds with “longstanding [] policy against
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unnecessary governmental interference with internal union
affairs.”  Steelworkers, Local 6799, 403 U.S. at 338.  
Moreover, the Union’s hypothetical of an endless series
of cloned complaints is not an adequate reason to deprive one of
its members of the benefit of a reasonable interpretation of
rights provided in the TWU constitution.  There will be time
enough to deal with the extreme case when and if it arises.  For
now, it is sufficient to note that Johnson’s efforts to obtain
redress are comfortably within the bounds of existing precedent.
 See Usery v. Local Div. 1205, Amalgamated Transit Union, 545
F.2d 1300, 1305-06 (1st Cir. 1976) (considering an LMRDA
challenge based on a post-election protest after finding that a
union member had not exhausted his internal union remedies
with his pre-election protest); see also 3 Nat’l Lawyers Guild,
Employee and Union Member Guide to Labor Law § 13.36
(Elise Gautier ed. West 2008) (noting that “a preelection protest
will normally not be either sufficient or necessary
exhaustion ... .”). 
There is another compelling reason why Johnson’s post-
election protest should be considered valid as a foundation for
the Secretary’s enforcement action.  This Court has long held
that, in the context of the LMRDA exhaustion requirement, a
union’s “failure to object” to a member’s efforts to exhaust can
be interpreted as “acquiescence or waiver.”  Elec. Workers,
Local 126,  728 F.2d  at 613.  Our decision in Elec. Workers,
Local 126 shows how broadly a union’s constitution should be
read in favor of a protesting union member.  In that case, a union
member conceded that he had failed to exhaust his union’s
remedies when protesting an election and thus could not rely on
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his own protest to support an administrative complaint to the
Secretary under the LMRDA.  Id. at 612.  However, another
member from the same union, though he subsequently died, had
fully exhausted the union’s remedies with regard to an election
protest.  Id.  The living union member sought to intervene in the
deceased union member’s protest and, based on the deceased
member’s protest, filed an administrative complaint with the
Secretary.  Id.  After receiving the living member’s notice of
joinder, the union did not dispute his eligibility to intervene, nor
did it dispute the timeliness of his intervention or of his
administrative complaint.  Id.  Although the union’s constitution
was silent on the topic of joinder, the union later claimed that a
member could not properly rely on another member’s protest as
the foundation for an administrative complaint under the
LMRDA.  Id. at 613.  The district court agreed.  We reversed
and held that the union’s failure to object amounted to a waiver
of any argument that internal union remedies had not been
exhausted.  Id.  We contrasted the case with the earlier case of
Steelworkers, District 19, 459 F.3d 348 (3d Cir. 1972), in which
“the complaining member was told by the union in no uncertain
terms that his relief within the union was limited to the
procedures that had already been completed.”  Elec. Workers,
Local 126, 728 F.2d at 613 (internal quotations omitted).  Our
decision in Elec. Workers, Local 126 concluded that treating the
union’s failure to object as a waiver helped vindicate “the public
policy of promoting untainted union elections ... .”  Id.
Johnson’s post-election protest in this case was accepted
without any objection from either Local 234 or the International
Union.  No one suggested that the pre-election protest had
exhausted Johnson’s remedies under the TWU constitution or
     The Local contends that the comments of TWU’s General9
Counsel were mis-characterized by the Secretary. 
Specifically, the Local asserts that the General Counsel’s
statement that “[t]he International does not take any position
on the timeliness of the complaint” is “hardly a ringing
endorsement of the Secretary’s interpretation of the TWU
constitution.”  (Appellee’s Ans. Br. at 30.)  Ringing or not,
the statement appears to us to support the inference that,
beyond acknowledging the adequacy of Johnson’s post-
election protest, the International Union simply wanted to stay
silent about the dispute.  That does nothing to undermine the
General Counsel’s statement that there was no defect in
Johnson’s protest.
     Johnson had until October 19, 2007, 10 days after he10
filed his post-election protest, to file a complaint with the
19
that his post-election protest was improper.  To the contrary,
TWU’s General Counsel later stated that there was “no defect”
in Johnson’s protest, and that “[t]he International does not take
any position on the timeliness of the complaint before the
Secretary of Labor.”   (App. at B62.)  Like the union in Elec.9
Workers, Local 126, the Union here failed to object to Johnson’s
post-election protest and, thus, waived any objection to the
validity of that protest under its constitution.  That result is
especially justified because Johnson still would have had the
time to file an administrative complaint with the Secretary based
on his pre-election protest, if the Union had done something to
inform him that his post-election protest was considered
invalid.  10
Secretary based on his pre-election protest. 
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 The Union contends, however, that, even if Johnson’s
post-election protest is treated as valid under the TWU
constitution, our precedent requires that the timeliness of any
LMRDA administrative complaint be measured from the date of
a pre-election protest and not a subsequent post-election protest.
That was also the District Court’s alternative holding, based on
its reading of our decisions in Teamsters, Local 30 and
Steelworkers, District 19.  Yet, those decisions do not support
that conclusion.
In Teamsters, Local 30, the union’s constitution expressly
provided for both a pre-election protest procedure and a separate
post-election protest procedure.  6 F.3d at 983-84.  The
aggrieved union member protested under the pre-election protest
mechanism only.  Id.  The Secretary argued that the member
“had exhausted his internal remedies for the purposes of [the
LMRDA]” with that pre-election protest.  Id. at 982.  We agreed
and held that, “given the ... express, mandatory pre-election
method [] of seeking redress of eligibility challenges ... ,” the
plaintiff had exhausted the applicable remedies available to him
under his union’s constitution.  Id. at 983 (original emphasis).
The District Court here correctly read Teamsters, Local 30 to
say that “pre-election protests may sufficiently exhaust the
remedies available to trigger the statutory requirement.”  (App.
at A10 (citing Teamsters, Local 30, 6 F.3d at 983).)  But it then
took the unwarranted step of concluding that, because pre-
election remedies may suffice as exhaustion in some cases, they
must necessarily be the exhaustion point in all cases.  That is not
21
true.  Teamsters, Local 30 stands for the proposition that the
timeliness of an LMRDA administrative complaint may be
measured from a pre-election protest, as opposed to a post-
election protest, depending on the union’s constitution.  Because
the union constitution at issue in that case required union
members to protest nominations before an election, and the
aggrieved union member protested through that mechanism, and
not through a post-election mechanism, it was sound to view the
pre-election protest as effective exhaustion, particularly since
that view gave the broadest protection to the union member’s
opportunity to complain to the Secretary for relief.  Unlike the
constitution in Teamsters, Local 30, the TWU constitution does
not require union members to bring an election protest before
the election.  Rather, the TWU constitution leaves open the
possibility of both pre- and post- election protests.  In the
absence of an express and separate pre-election protest
provision, the present case is clearly distinguishable from
Teamsters, Local 30.
In Steelworkers, District 19, the union constitution
similarly “delineat[ed] the method by which protests concerning
nominations may be considered by the union.”  459 F.2d at 350.
The protest had to occur before an election; there was no post-
election recourse for challenging nominations provided for in
the constitution.  Id. at 351.  The Court, noting that the union’s
pre-election protest mechanism was exclusive and the “only
[mechanism] capable of dealing with protests such as that filed
by [the complaining union member],” held that the LMRDA
administrative complaint had to be measured in reference to the
pre-election protest and not an attempted post-election protest.
Id. at 352.  Again, Local 234 argues that Steelworkers, District
22
19 stands for the proposition that LMRDA complaints must be
measured from pre-election protests, and not post-election ones.
(Appellee’s Ans. Br. at 20-23.)  Again, that reading is
misguided.  The constitution in Steelworkers, District 19
designated a pre-election procedure as the sole mechanism for
addressing nomination grievances, while nothing in the TWU
constitution requires union members to raise nomination protests
through any particular or exclusive method.  In sum, the effort
to draw from Teamsters, Local 30 and Steelworkers, District 19
a blanket requirement regarding exhaustion procedures under
disparate union constitutions is unfounded and must be rejected.
If a union desires to receive all election protests before
the election occurs, it may accomplish that end by saying so in
its constitution.  The union has both the opportunity and the
burden of laying out such rules in clear and unambiguous
language in its governing charter.  The TWU constitution
contains no such limitation.  Moreover, neither the text of the
LMRDA nor our precedent supports the narrow interpretation of
the TWU constitution espoused by the District Court.  Our
decisions urge the opposite view.  We reiterate today that
ambiguous constitutional provisions must be construed broadly
in favor of complaining union members, whose interpretations
need only be reasonable under the circumstances.  Johnson’s
interpretation of the TWU constitution was reasonable, and,
therefore, his post-election protest constitutes an “available”
union remedy under the LMRDA.  Because Johnson’s post-
election protest was a valid exercise of an available union
remedy, his subsequent administrative complaint to the
Secretary was timely and the Secretary’s LMRDA enforcement
23
action based on that administrative complaint is jurisdictionally
sound. 
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the District Court’s
dismissal of the Secretary’s complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and remand the case for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.  
